A kind blog reader forwarded me the link to the below story, which may seem to indicate that the FAA has finally got out of bed with Boeing and has started to do its job of reforming its corrupt bedmate. My comments are in parenthesis within the story:

FAA seeks $1M penalty for Boeing 777 problem

FAA wants $1 million penalty for installation problems with Boeing 777 oxygen system

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/FAA-seeks ... 0&.v=6

Joshua Freed, AP Business Writer, On Monday June 27, 2011, 5:16 pm EDT

The Federal Aviation Administration is pursuing a penalty of more than $1 million against Boeing Co. because it says the airplane maker didn't follow its own instructions for installing oxygen systems on the 777.

(Hmmmm....a significant fine indeed, albeit incorrect installation and QA rollerstamping of emergency oxygen system installations you would think might even deserve a bigger fine. After all, passenger and crew emergency oxygen systems on Boeing planes are the far most likely to be used of the two commercial airline manufacturers planes, as, as my former coworker used to say to me on the Boeing EBU (Turbofan Engine Build Up) line--"they (Boeing management) are just pushing garbage out the door".)

The instruction turned out to be unnecessary and Boeing deleted it, a Boeing spokeswoman said.

(Typical Boeing corruption. Instead of fix a noncompliance (even an uber-serious one like this in the emergency oxygen system) and/or even notify the airlines about it, they get some engineer whose ethics extend only so far as their fear of losing their Boeing paycheck lets it (not far at all) to cancel the requirement Boeing intentionally violated multiple times and rollerstamping inspectors rollerstamped as complying when it didn't, and then have the same or another engineer with similar ethics perform a global "it's all fine" (when it actually isn't) buyoff of the defect so that Boeing doesn't have to let the airlines know (per bogus Boeing internal procedures to cover up such defects) they are flying Boeing jets with defective emergency oxygen systems.)

The FAA said on Monday that it found the problems when it inspected nine new planes between April and October 2010. Hoses for the passenger oxygen system were installed at a sharper angle than allowed, the FAA said. The system feeds the masks that allow passengers to get oxygen if the cabin loses pressure in flight.

(Non-essential systems, right? Wrong. Non-essential to some corrupt Boeing manager or QA manager just trying to "get the garbage out the door" (as my coworker used to say), but not to passengers and crew. After all, Boeing airplanes are so defect riddled due to the QA management fraud documented on this site that the oxygen systems better be fully compliant to the strictest (pre-unethical engineer cancellation) requirements because those defects are highly likely to force the immediate need for that oxygen system, such as in the recent near hull loss accident exploding 737-- http://www.usnewsgateway.com/2011/04/03 ... 7s-113467/ )

Boeing spokeswoman Alana Broadbent said the hose would have had a 2 degree bend if installed according to instructions. Because the instructions were unclear, some were bent as much as 10 degrees, she said.

(Wow, only five times the tolerance out of tolerance. Surely no big deal to a company who pushes "garbage" uninspected airliners out the door to airlines (as proven on this site and by this incident, right. Of course, believing anything a Boeing spokesperson says is extreme folly. The truth is far, far worse than they spin. Boeing PR broadly bends the truth and even breaks it frequently. How do you tell when a Boeing spokesperson is lying...no need to fill in the answer to that for you.)

However, Boeing tested the hoses and found no problem even when they were bent as much as 10 degrees and put under double the pressure they needed to withstand. So, instead of requiring a 2-degree angle, Boeing just deleted the instruction because it's not possible to install the part at more than a 10 degree angle anyway, she said.

(Typical corrupt Boeing. Why comply with engineering requirements for critical systems when you can rig up a non-real world test to CYA from letting the airlines know they have defective emergency oxygen systems or from having Boeing fix the defects? Loosen the requirements to make the defective work compliant. Now that's how corrupt Boeing management "adds value" to the bottom line by accepting additional risk unbeknownst on behalf of all Boeing airliner passengers and crew.)

She said that other 777s in the factory were inspected. Because there was no safety problem with the hoses, 777s that had been made previously were not re-inspected, she said. For the same reason, Boeing did not issue a service bulletin, which advises airplane operators to inspect or fix problems discovered after a plane has entered service.

(Why would 777 passengers and crew need to breathe in an emergency? Surely even 300 plus people gasping for air during an emergency landing attempt is no big deal if you are one of the Boeing managers that was involved in this cover up. What do these miscreants tell their children they do for a living?--"Johnny, I just reduced the chances of millions of people they could breathe if one of the defects in our defective airliners 'pops' so I could pad the companies bottom line by not fixing those defects, but instead getting someone to say they were OK instead, even though five times out of tolerance--want to grow up and do daddy's job--do ya Johnny?" Hopefully "Johnny" would have enough ethics to answer negatively.)

The FAA said it can charge $25,000 for each mistake, and it counts as a new mistake every time the mis-installed part passed inspection. There were 46 such inspections, which would have totaled $1.15 million if FAA sought the maximum penalty for each one. The FAA offered to compromise with Boeing for $1.05 million.

($25,000 for each mistake? Wow. If the FAA actually fully inspected a Boeing airliner, then, if they imposed that fine for every defect found on that typical Boeing airliner, then the FAA would be fining Boeing at least the cost of the airliner, if not multiple times more. Each Boeing airliner has thousands of defects when delivered. hundreds or thousands in the electrical system. Thousands in the fasteners. hundreds or thousands in the other systems. Do the math. 46 rollerstamped inspections in a row? Sadly, not a record for Boeing inspectors. On my companion site, www.thelastinspector.com , I detail several incidents in just my area where coworkers rollerstamped inspections hundreds of times in a row as compliant when the installation was defective until moi found the noncompliance by actual inspection of the installation. Glad the FAA is seemingly playing hardball with such a miniscule "discount." However, what only matters is how much Boeing actually pays in the end. Boeing frequently whittles such fines down to nothing by falsely promising reforms and asking the FAA to take the overblown "costs" to Boeing of those "reforms" off the fine. The FAA should never trust any Boeing manager promise of reforms any more than anyone should trust that Boeing PR won't broadly bend or break the truth.)

The FAA said Boeing had failed to correct a known problem in installing the system.

"There is no excuse for waiting to take action when it comes to safety," said Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood.

(Oh how wrong you are, Mr. Lahood. Boeing has myriad excuses to do so for every safety issue. It is purely a cost benefit analysis to them, including the cost of lives lost. And the calculation almost always is weighted in the Boeing bottom line's favor. This incident is a good example of that. Reworking 46 installations so that passengers can breathe easier in the inevitable Boeing emergency requiring emergency oxygen, or cooking the "instruction" books with predetermined conclusion non-real world tests to make the noncompliant "officially" compliant after the fact to allow the defective installations with no rework. Mr. Lahood no doubt knows just what a wholly corrupt FAA he has under him pretending to oversee Boeing's Production and Type Design Certificates. The question then becomes, does this fine signal an effort to reform that corruption, or a typical effort to make it only appear to the public that the FAA is doing its job while the corruption goes on unabated.)

The FAA proposed the penalty in a June 3 letter which it publicized on Monday. Boeing has 30 days from the date of the letter to respond.

An FAA spokesman wasn't sure of the last time the agency sought civil penalties from Boeing. The last publicized fine on the FAA's website was in 2002 when it sought $344,450 in civil penalties for installing various parts improperly, or for using unapproved parts. The violations were from the 1990s through April 2000.

(The 1999/2000 STA (Special Technical Audit-- http://pogoarchives.org/m/tr/faa-boeing ... 000211.pdf ) was the last time I can remember such a significant fine, albeit it was less ( http://www.seattlepi.com/default/articl ... 085843.php ).

End of article.

So is this fine and other recent FAA actions such as FOD audits of Boeing factories a sea change of the FAA from bedmate of corrupt Boeing into the independent oversight agency over Boeing/Design Production it is supposed to be?

In my informed opinion, the answer is not just a no, but a hell no.

Until we see some Boeing managers up on criminal charges, the merry-go-round of employment between the FAA and Boeing ended, less working together on Boeing fraud and more independent oversight, it is simply corruption as usual between the FAA and Boeing.

What is prompting these essentially PR stunts by the FAA to make it seem like it doesn't still share the same bed as Boeing?

My guess is that it is an effort to make the illegitimate inevitable granting of Type and Production Certificates to the 787 by the FAA to Boeing seem legitimate, and those documents worth more than their actual worth--only the cost of the printing of them.

Arrogance.

Boeing senior management and wanna be senior management is famous for it.

One of Boeing’s managers (as documented on www.thelastinspector.com ) even said in 2006 (rightly) that Boeing is the most arrogant company on the face of the planet.

But Boeing’s Chief Counsel J. Michael Luttig brought world leading Boeing management’s arrogance to even loftier heights over any other company on the planet last week in a May 3rd, 2011 letter to Lafe Solomon, Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, when he arrogantly posited that the multiple statements of Boeing senior management stating they placed a second 787 line in South Carolina in order to make an end run around the IAM union’s ability to strike when Boeing inevitably places a takeaway contract on the “negotiating” table at the last minute and says to either take the takeaways or strike and they’ll move the work elsewhere, were “mischaracterized” as meaning something other than they obviously meant.

Lying about the meaning of these anti-union statements, some of the very few true and plainly meaning statements released to the public by Boeing Senior Management in well over the last decade, was arrogance of a new level at Boeing, showing Luttig to be a candidate to take over from Head Boeing Prevaricator CEO Jim McNerney when he leaves, is fired by the Board, or is held to account for his own violations of ethics and the law.

Quotes from Luttig's laughable letter:

"A number of these statements, which are critical to your case against Boeing, fundamentally misquote or mischaracterize statements by Boeing executives and actions taken by the Company."

Wrong. As noted, Boeing executives' statements about the union hate that drove them to site the second 787 line in South Carolina (SC) were some of the few truthful statements in a long time from those executives. Indeed, they were understated compared to the "union avoidance/union breaking" policy of Boeing execs they have been working to for many years.

The linked article (for which I was the primary source) indeed states the following, showing the two-faced labor policy of Boeing execs at that time, in 2004:

'But despite the peace overtures, beneath the surface the Boeing labor strategy is steely.

As outlined in an internal document dated mid-December 2003, the first two imperatives of that strategy are: "reduce union leverage; reduce union employees."'

The same anti-union and union busting policies are still in place at Boeing today. However, Luttig has the arrogance to lie that that isn't so, even when Boeing's executives essentially re-affirmed the policies in their recent surprisingly truthful and open statements about union avoidance driving them to SC for the second 787 line.

Indeed, Luttig not only is privy to the internal Boeing labor strategy I was privy to (and any other employee who wanted to look for it on the Boeing network was privy to)in 2003/2004, but he surely has access to far more damning evidence of Boeing executive labor lawbreaking policy of today than that gem, which makes his misstatements in the letter to Soloman all the more arrogant.

Then, he has even greater arrogance in telling Solomon what to do:

"You have a responsibility to correct these misquotations and mischaracteriztions, for the public record and also for purposes of the complaint you
have filed."

Too bad Luttig didn't have the responsibility to tell the truth and/or hold back on the extreme arrogance laced throughout this badly lawyered letter.

"Through these misquotations and mischaractcrizations, you have done a grave disservice to The Boeing Company, its executives and shareholders, and to the 160,000 Boeing employees worldwide."

LOL. Another obviously lie by Luttig in this letter, and we are only a few sentences into it.

As noted, they weren't "misquotations" (contrary to Mr. Luutig's apparent belief, repeating a lie many times does not make it true).

"Done a grave disservice to Boeing?" Oh, contrare. This rare holding of Boeing to the law by Mr. Solomon is probably the best thing that has happened to Boeing in a long time. The sooner that Luttig and the rest of Boeing management learn that they have to abide by the law the same as we do, the better for the companies future prospects. For, as I and most people believe (except, quite apparently, for Boeing management's beliefs), it is not in the best long term interest of Boeing to engage in fraud and lawbreaking.

And last, but not the least lie in this sentence, I would say at least half the employees of Boeing would side with Mr. Soloman and the NLRB on this issue, and not Boeing's lying treatise on the issue. After all, tens of thousands of those 160,000 are in the IAM union that filed the original complaint. Most of the SPEEA Engineer's union's employees would also side with solomon, as well as most of the non-SC non-management remainder of the Boeing workforce.

"And, of course, you have filed a complaint based upon these misstatements that cannot be credibly maintained under law."

Another untruth. Perhaps the Seattle Mariners could put Mr. Luttig on the team. If he batted like he lied in this letter so far, he would be the first player in MLB to bat 1.000 in a season.

Then, arrogantly to the extreme yet again, he accuses Soloman of doing exactly what he himself is doing in this letter--basing his arguments on lies:

'As you well know, no work-none at all-was "removed" or "transferred" from Puget Sound. The second line for the 787 is a new final assembly line. As it did not previously exist in Puget Sound or elsewhere, the second assembly line could not have been "removed" from, "transferred" or otherwise "moved" to South
Carolina. Simply put, the work that is and will be done at our Charleston, South Carolina final assembly facility is new work, required and added in response to the historic customer demand for the 787.'

LOL. After wrongly and arrogantly accusing Soloman of intentionally basing the NLRB's cahrges on falsehoods. Lutting lies about the movement of the work to SC, as well as the reason for the second line's existence.

The line is "new" only because Boeing decided to transfer the work to SC in what was meant to be a death blow to the unions at Boeing, particularly the IAM. If it was placed in Everett as it should have been per its agreement with Washington State, nothing would be new except that another bay of the Everett plant would be used for the 787 work. Only because of its illegal union retaliation plans was a completely new line (including the building to house it) built in SC, with the help of SC "legal bribes" to pay for much of that construction.

And the union and NLRB have irrefutable proof of that (irrefutable, that is, except in the fact adverse insulated world that Boeing's Chief Counsel Luttig apparently lives in). Boeing's efforts to "non-value-addedly" (except in union busting efforts) duplicate all work so that a strike at Union (in more ways than one) Boeing would allow 787s to continue to be built and delivered at Confederate non-union Boeing in SC proves it was not simply the opening of a "new" 787 line--it was illegal union avoidance in the extreme, and directly was designed to render Boeing workers' right to strike moot in the case of 787 deliveries (if one ever occurs).

Boeing only committing to building the 787 line in SC after the workers decertified their union at the existing plant in SC further proves the effort was primarily an attack on union rights at Boeing, not a needed effort to expand out of Washington because capacity here had been exceeded.

Additionally, it was not a move to increase the quality or safety of 787 work, as SC workers were inexperienced in the extreme compared to their Washington counterparts. Boeing didn't care about this extra risk to the program using an inexperienced workforce that Boeing knew had caused myriad problems in Everett 787 Final Assy because of incomplete or defective work that had to be finished/reworked before/during that Final Assy.

The noted "legal SC bribes" to Boeing were after Boeing similarly essentially extorted money from Washington State under the false promise it would site 787 final assembly in Washington state.

"No member of the International Association of Machinists' union (lAM) in Puget Sound has lost his or her job, or otherwise suffered any adverse employment action, as a result of the placement of this new work in the State of South Carolina."

Wrong again.

Tell that to the hundreds of IAM and other workers that would have been hired here in Washington to do the work had Boeing not decided on the retaliatory move of the work to SC. That Boeing decided to move the work to SC after it failed to extort takeaways and other favors (such as an unprecedented long term contract) from the union in "negotiations" (take it or leave it "negotiations," that is) shows additionally that the line was not simply "new work," as Luttig misstates, but work that was to be done in Everett if the union would give up its basic rights.

"Mischaracterizing what Boeing did by calling it a "transfer" of work, or suggesting that Boeing broke commitments to the State of Washington, is bad enough. Far more egregious, however, are the statements that have been made concerning the motives and intent of Boeing's leaders- specifically, that senior Boeing executives sought to "punish" union employees and to "threaten" them for their past and possible future strikes, through the Company's statements and its location of the second final assembly line in South Carolina."

Boeing's Chief Counsel seems either ignorant of Boeing management anti-union culture here, or just creating another lie out of whole cloth in his unfortunately surprisingly factless treatise to the NLRB.

Any Boeing employee who has been through a strike (and I've been through at least four of them myself) knows that Boeing management habitually retaliates against strikers when they return from strikes, through creating bad work environments, withholding of overtime from workers for as long as possible because they know striking workers need the money even though work is backlogged to the extreme, and other methods. Boeing also threatens workers with various methods before contract vote time, inferring what the company will do if workers don't accept the non-negotiated thrown on the table at the last minute takeaway contract and go on strike, including threats of moving work elsewhere, as the NLRB noted, I believe, in the 2008 "negotiation" process.

'The complaint alleges that Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO Jim Albaugh stated that Boeing "decided to locate its 787 Dreamliner second line in South Carolina because of past Unit strikes, and threatened the loss of future Unit work opportunities because of such strikes." (Complaint Section 6(e).) The complaint cites a
March 2, 2010 interview of Mr. Albaugh by the Seattle Times, but does not purport to be quoting any particular statement. The NLRB's website, however, offers a "fact sheet" that quotes Mr. Albaugh as saying: "The overriding factor [in transferring the
line] was not the business climate. And it was not the wages we're paying today. It was that we cannot afford to have a work stoppage, you know, every three years."'

Wow. Pretty cut and dried. Let's see how Mr. Luttig attampts to explain away this true statement by Mr. Albaugh:

"It would, of course, have been entirely pennissible under existing law for Mr. Albaugh to have made a statement that the Company considered the economic costs of future strikes in its business decision to locate work in South Carolina--or even
that it was the sole reason for such decision. But Mr. Albaugh did not even say either of these things."

Really? I think the NLRA law differs on that subject.

'Mr. Albaugh's full statement was as follows:

"Well I think you can probably say that about all the states in the country right now with the economy being what it is. But again, the overriding factor was not the business climate and it was not the wages we're paying people today. It was that we can't afford to have a work stoppage every three years. We can't afford to continue the rate of escalation of wages as we have in the past. You know, those are the overriding factors. And my bias was to stay here but we could not get those two issues done despite the best efforts of the Union and the best efforts of the company."'

Hmmm...so Luttig is arguing the illegal retaliation for striking was only half the reason for moving? And the other half was "wages we're paying now are fine, but we can't afford to negotiate higher wages? I'm Glad Luttig has this cushy executive job with Boeing, because I don't think that kind of legal argument would be considered exemplary in his field of work anywhere else.

"The italicized sentences-which were deliberately omitted from your office's presentation of this quotation on its website..."

Accusing the NLRB of Boeing-like creative losing of facts adverse to their case I don't think is the most endearing way to approach your legal adversaries. But, it is in keeping with traditional, planet leading use of arrogance, however.

"...make clear that Mr. Albaugh was referencing two, rather than one, "overriding factors," only one of which is the risk of
a future strike. These are critical omissions that directly contradict your apparent theory of this case."

Not really. Both reasons, as noted, were illegal efforts to deny the IAM their rights to negotiate wages and benefits and strike if Boeing did not negotiate in good faith on those issues as usual.

"Moreover, no reasonable reader of Mr. Albaugh's interview would depict it as part of a "consistent message" that Boeing sought to "punish" its union employees."

(No anti-union "reasonable reader," that is, no doubt). Fortunately Many more execs than Mr. Albaugh have been on record that the company would not tolerate anything but obliging acceptance of its last best takeaway offer by Boeing unions.

"Mr. Albaugh expresses his "bias" in favor of Puget Sound and lauds the good-faith efforts of both sides. He explains that the company's preference was to locate the new production line in Puget Sound and that both the company and the union made
good-faith efforts to accomplish that shared objective. Thus, when not misquoted, it is not even arguable that Mr. Albaugh's statement constitutes a "message" of "punishment" to the union for its past or future strike capability."

LOL. If this is Luttig's typical twisted logic, I shudder to think what happened to all rightly aggrieved parties that came before him when he was a judge. Alas, maybe being the Chief Counsel of perhaps America's most lawbreaking large corporation frees him to mince the words of his executives many times until they mean exactly what he wants them to mean.

"The complaint's attempt to depict a statement by Jim McNerney, Boeing's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, as a threat to punish union employees is but another example of mischaractcrization. The complaint alleges that Mr. McNerney
"made an extended statement regarding 'diversifying (Boeing's) labor pool and labor relationship,' and moving the 787 Dreamliner work to South Carolina due to 'strikes happening every three to four years in Puget Sound. '" (Complaint Section 6(a) (emphasis
added).)"

Wrong. No "mischaracterization" by McNerney this time, albeit McNerney will dissemble even to Congressional Committees. As noted, the NLRB's usage of Boeing executive statements such as McNerney's "three to four years" statement is the best use of the few truthful Boeing executive statements out there. And Boeing executive Luttig himself proves that, in this mistruth laced treatise against what he must actually know are rightful labor charges against Boeing's union adverse senior executives.

Turns out that the 737 that explosively decompressed due to a new "sunroof" spontaneously blowing out of one of the last (and relatively the newest) of the pre-737NG "737 Classics" was thusly compromised by the Boeing/FAA fraud documented here and on my companion site, www.thelastinspector.com :

Southwest Plane With Hole in Fuselage Had Misaligned Rivets

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-2 ... -says.html

What is interesting about this article is the picture of the Boeing 737 blown out panel section and the following sections of the article:

"The Southwest Airlines Co. (LUV) plane which had a nearly 5-foot-long hole open during flight at 34,000 feet on April 1 had misaligned rivet holes where two parts of the fuselage were assembled, a U.S. safety board said."

(Interesting. This is obviously a manufacturing defect rollerstamped as acceptable (if it was inspected at all) by Boeing's compromised QA System. But what they mean by "misaligned rivets" could be a few things--rivets that were drilled/installed at greater than the 2 degree or so misalignment allowed in the BAC5004-1 specification, and/or possibly rivets installed in misaligned holes in the skin panels, causing "misaligned rivets." I would suspect the later possibility, as I believe it would compromised the structural integrity of the airliner far more.)

"Cracking has been found only on five Southwest jets previously identified, and it’s too early to speculate on the cause, Chicago-based Boeing said in a statement today."

(See my comment later on in the blog on the same Boeing statement reiterated in the quoted WSJ article.)

"Portions of the panels from the five planes, delivered between 1994 and 1996, have been shipped to Boeing, which is analyzing them, the company said in a statement."

(Bad move to let a corrupt company management investigate what was caused by its own corruption. No unbiased results could come from such an "investigation" by the guilty of themselves.)

“Boeing will not speculate on what the NTSB’s initial findings may suggest about the root cause,” the company said in its statement, adding that it is “fully engaged” in the investigation.

(Fully engaged in a PR led cover up of the incident, no doubt. The root cause, of course, as noted later in this blog, is already known--Boeing management itself--specifically its fraud intentionally negating QA at Boeing in order to pad the bottom line by delivering defect riddled aircraft to customers like Southwest.)

Southwest is confident that its aircraft meet the FAA directive requirements, company spokesman Brad Hawkins said. “Southwest Airlines looks forward to the results of the completed investigation,” Hawkins said.

(Meeting FAA directive requirements is purely voluntary, as the FAA has no effective or independent oversight of Boeing or airlines. So, hopefully Southwests' confidence is justified, as their own integrity in repairing the aircraft is the only thing that will ensure compliance with the noted compromised/nonexistent oversight.)

And here is a Wall Street Journal Article (really a Boeing biased editorial) about the defects that caused the explosion/rupture:

BUSINESS
APRIL 25, 2011
Boeing Factory Probed in Rupture of Southwest Jet

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... usiness%29

"Investigators suspect that a manufacturing lapse at a Boeing Co. factory 15 years ago is why the fuselage of a Southwest Airlines Co. jetliner ruptured in midair this month, according to government and industry officials."

"It is too early to draw definitive conclusions, the officials said, and further testing and data analysis could bring other issues to the forefront. But the federal probe increasingly is focused on some type of assembly-line lapse—a rare occurrence in modern aircraft production— that would explain an incident that stunned the airline industry and worried travelers."

(Bullshit. There is nothing at Boeing so common as "an assembly line lapse"--even defects that deliver to customers, like Southwest experienced in this case. This article is hopelessly biased. Whatever happened to the Journal?)

"The Boeing 737-300, with 122 people aboard, had a five-foot gash rip open in the upper part of its cabin and suffered a rapid decompression while cruising at about 34,000 feet on April 1. No one was seriously hurt and the twin-engine jet made an emergency landing at a military base in Arizona."

"The incident prompted Southwest to temporarily ground and immediately inspect 79 of its oldest Boeing 737s and sparked a round of swift inspections of about 100 more aging 737s at other airlines world-wide. Hundreds of additional jets are slated to undergo the same checks in coming years as they rack up flights."

"In addition to the Southwest plane that ruptured, five of the airline's other aging 737s were found with fuselage cracks requiring repairs."

"The 737 fuselages are built at a factory in Wichita, Kan., which in 1996 was wholly owned by Boeing."

"Boeing said no similar problems have been discovered at other airlines. "No conclusions have been reached about the root cause of the inspection findings" or how they may relate to the April 1 event, and "any attempt to draw conclusions on either would be premature and speculative," the Chicago-based company said."

(Wow. Boeing so arrogant it is telling people how to react to its defective aircraft. Not surprising, considering the lack of ethics and arrogance of its management, but breathtakingly arrogant nonetheless. I can tell you right now what the root cause of this near disaster was--Boeing management fraud that negated the Quality Assurance that would have documented and gotten the defective installation reworked/repaired absent the pressure by management to ignore defects in Boeing aircraft to save cost, meet schedule, and pad the bottom line by intentionally delivering defect riddled aircraft to customers.)

Production-line snafus happen occasionally to all aircraft makers, despite strict standards, substantial quality-assurance teams and constant government oversight. Starting in the late 1990s, Boeing suffered its share of 737 problems, from loose nuts on the tails of some planes to improperly wired engine-vibration and fire-warning systems. But most of those problems were identified and fixed relatively quickly.

(WTF? How skewed can an article be? This is probably the most fucked up and untrue sentence I have seen in any article about the effects of the Boeing fraud I have documented extensively on this blog and on my website--"Production-line snafus"?--bullshit--humans (specifically, corrupt Boeing management) caused this. It was not some happenstance and random production line snarl behind it. In such conditions, both mechanics and inspectors could still do their jobs, that is, if Boeing management didn't inevitably interfere with them doing so by pressuring them to cut corners to get back on schedule, quality and safety be damned--"happen occasionally to all aircraft makers"?--another bunch of bullshit--there is no large aircraft company so corrupt, from the top down to the production floor shop and QA personnel--"despite strict standards"--bullshit again. Even if the standards are strict, Boeing aircraft are only built loosely to them, at best, due to management corruption that values rollerstamping inspections off rather than the inspectors actually inspecting the work and documenting all defects for repair. So, all Boeing airplanes deliver with literally hundreds or thousands of defects each. Of course, the actual amount is unknown, as much of each airplane is not inspected as required, and defects will not be known until they blow up like this one in flight--"substantial quality-assurance teams"--bullshit again, for the aforesaid reasons-- "constant government oversight"--true, only if you mean constant oversight (as in ignoring) of the noted Boeing fraud.--"Starting in the late 1990s, Boeing suffered its share of 737 problems, from loose nuts on the tails of some planes to improperly wired engine-vibration and fire-warning systems. But most of those problems were identified and fixed relatively quickly."--WTF? Is there an anti-Pulitzer for whomever wrote this article? "Boeing suffered"? "But most of those problems were identified and fixed relatively quickly"? How Boeing skewed can you get. This isn't journalism. Considering the circumstances, its essentially a fricking advert or damage control editorial for Boeing. Stating that Boeing suffered during the fraud it committed that was behind all of these problems is like saying a serial killer suffered when killing his victims.)

This time, investigators led by the National Transportation Safety Board are trying to unravel the potential impact of riveting techniques and certain sealants going back to around 1996, according to the officials. They said investigators also are looking into factory tooling used to hold plane parts during assembly. Possible production problems were reported Saturday by ABC news.

("Production problems"? Not accurate. Its fraud, pure and simple, as documented on my blog and website.)

A big reason behind the manufacturing-related focus, according to government and industry officials, is that a number of the Southwest planes with fuselage cracks were built around the same time. The officials said it is too early to know whether the suspect Southwest jets illustrate a quality-control problem involving specific workers and a relatively short span of time, or whether they are the result of broader production issues.

(Of course, it is obviously a Quality Control problem. Every Boeing manufacturing defect is, especially when Boeing won't allow inspectors to inspect these body structure jobs or any other job at Boeing to even the minimum requirements. I offer as proof this portion of my 2002 report of QA Management fraud at Boeing from my companion website, www.thelastinspector.com :

(From URL: http://www.thelastinspector.com/19801.html ):

"3-1-07 quote: This quote is also from my first report to the FAA local MIDO office, when I was naive and chose not to believe all those press reports about the FAA being the "handmaiden of the aviation industry" and a "tombstone agency."...This quote...details my history as an inspector at Boeing, and some of the other corrupt Boeing QA supervisors I've worked for over the years:

When I heard that the Company was hiring inspectors, I volunteered for transfer. I thought that the Company needed more competent inspectors from what I had experienced on the door crew. I also liked the idea of being a grade six, instead of a grade four, on the pay scale. I also liked the idea of getting away from breathing in aluminum dust when I trimmed the PEDs, and away from lifting 100 LB slide packs and slide simulator tools, as I had been experiencing some back pain occasionally after lifting them. Plus, I had always been good at reading drawings. I had been thinking about being an engineer when Boeing had hired me as a mechanic in 1987. I had taken a quarter or trimester (I don’t remember which) of engineering related courses, including engineering graphics and Calculus, at Highline Community College prior to being hired at Boeing. When other mechanics seemed to have trouble interpreting drawings, and some never bothered interpreting them at all, I had no trouble with them and referred to them when necessary in my builds to ensure what I built was per the drawing, as I knew our inspectors on the Door Crew would not.

My requested transfer was approved and I went to approximately three weeks of inspection training classes. The classes were refreshing. They confirmed what I had long believed about inspection at Boeing, but had seen very little of. The instructors never once confirmed through their teachings that the incompetence and carelessness of the importance of their work of my Door Crew inspectors was the way inspection was to be done at the Boeing Company. Quite the contrary. The number of courses and the detailed instruction confirmed what I had long hoped to be true: The inspector’s function at Boeing was important, so much so that three weeks of detailed courses were necessary to prepare the new inspector for his essential job function. The only negative thing I had heard in my classes that said anything other than to do our jobs by the book was in one class where the teacher, a former inspector, had recommended that we not write a discrepancy up if the rework would cause more damage than the original discrepancy had. I could think of no such situation given competent mechanics to perform the rework so I ignored that advice.

At the end of classes I was assigned to the 777 Body Structures area as an inspector. It was not the area I had hoped to get, but I was O.K. with it. I was a Boeing Quality Assurance Inspector after all, even if the installations in the area were only simple basic and secondary structure installations and you couldn’t hear yourself think due to all of the rivet gun noise. I had hoped for an assignment further down the production line where there were more complex installations. My preference was to be a Door Crew inspector, but I was told they usually didn’t put you in the same area that you came from.

I don’t remember if it was my first day as a Body Structures inspector, or not, but I believe it was close to my first day. I had logged in on a "job complete" inspection on the (electronic) call sheet...on a skin lap job on a body structure section. This job was huge. There were, I think, several hundreds or even thousands of rivets (mostly) on this major job. I believe there were some Hi-Loks on the job. I knew Hi-Loks well, as I had installed many of them myself, but rivets were another story. I knew very little about solid rivet installation, and that was pretty much all this job did. I pulled all of the drawings for the job, and went through the plan. I read the specifications I didn’t know that had to do with the job. I went to the tool room to get the correct rivet gages in case I needed them, which I hoped I didn‘t. After all, these were probably very experienced structure mechanics (certainly more experienced at their jobs than I was at mine at that point) that had done the job, and I would just be able to eyeball all of these rivets with my "calibrated eyes" as they all would likely be installed correctly. I went out with my drawings and blank pickup forms and began to inspect the skin lap job.

I couldn’t believe all of the defects that I found on that job! Oh well, I thought, I had to do my job regardless of the number or extent of defects, as I was taught in class, for the most part, so I documented everything I found. At the end of the inspection I had several pages of pickup items written on the one job. I don’t remember the exact number of pages, but it seemed to be a huge amount to me, the new inspector. I hoped that that job was an aberration, and the number of pickup items was only due to the workmanship of the mechanics involved, and I would not have to write so many pickups on every similar sized job all of the time if more skilled mechanics had done the work. I was glad my QA manager obviously knew I was new at this so that they would allow me the extra time that it had taken me to document those defects than it would take a more experienced inspector that had inspected that job before.

I believe it was the next day when I got a transfer notice that I was being reassigned to the 777 Wing Stub Body Join area."

(So, as you can see from my experience (and other Boeing inspectors experiences) that you will be retaliated against by management if you actually do your job and document all defects for rework/repair during such critical body structure inspections behind the current Boeing 737 near disaster. I was transferred to the 777 Wing Stub Body Join area, and other inspectors who dared to do their jobs were commonly transferred to an even worse area of the factory--the wing line, where you essentially had to be a contortionist to do your job.)

"Inspections have been completed world-wide on approximately 75% of the 190 airplanes affected" by mandatory inspection rules, and only the handful of Southwest planes have "shown small subsurface cracks," Boeing said. Those portions of their aluminum skins are being examined at Boeing facilities."

('Only the handful of Southwest planes have "shown small subsurface cracks," Boeing said.'--"Only"? and "Small"? Boeing PR no doubt wrote this. They way to tell if Boeing is lying about something or spinning it so far from the truth it is essentially a lie is just to look for the identifier of all such lies--the words "Boeing said." And why the heck would Boeing be allowed to keep the skins and "investigate" rather than the NTSB keeping all of them and doing the investigation. Boeing management has the ethics of an Enron executive in heat, I have experienced. They can be trusted to do nothing that requires ethics, such as such an investigation into their own fuck ups, which they obviously have motivation to skew or cover up just as much as their PR department has done during this debacle.)

"Federal Aviation Administration chief Randy Babbitt said this month that his agency and Boeing were looking into "manufacturing techniques," among other things."

("Manufacturing techniques"? WTF? Did Boeing and the FAA decide on this wording during one of their trysts in the bed they share so as to minimize the PR damage to Boeing? Manufacturing fuck ups and intentional QA oversight of the defects would be the truth. "Manfacturing defects and compromised QA escapes" would be the printable way to put it.)

"Over the decades, the FAA and the industry have developed a set of inspection procedures to identify and repair fuselage cracks on aging jets before they can lead to major safety hazards."

(None of which can be relied upon as Boeing and the FAA share the same bed, and Boeing holds veto power because of that over anything the FAA proposes, or even thinks about before it could become a formal proposal. Take the fact that Boeing won't even let the FAA keep the data it collects on safety related incidents (complaints from customers about in service incidents on Boeing's defective aircraft) in the fleet. This alone shows that the FAA is the handmaiden of Boeing, as any real, independent FAA would insist on not only being notified about every such incident airlines report to Boeing, but that the FAA must get and keep forever any such data so as to effectively monitor the safety of the fleet and the raft of defects on each plane rolling off of Boeing's production line.)

"The Southwest incident this month surprised regulators and airlines because Boeing had reassured them the planes didn't need to undergo detailed structural inspections on that part of its fuselage for at least several more years."

(What this shows is that you can't believe anything Boeing "assures" or "reassures" you. While the Engineers may have been correct that this shouldn't be a risk in Boeing planes built per engineering design until planes reach 60,000 cycles or so, the problem is that no Boeing plane has ever been built to engineering design--especially the ones built during the 1997-ish production snafus and anything built during the tenure of the current crop of corrupt "schedule is everything," "Quality is non-value added" Boeing management, which extends from today back 20 or 30 years.)

"The planes targeted for inspection were 737 models manufactured between 1993 and 2000. Boeing executives have said that because of a fuselage design change, current 737 models are unaffected by the problem."

(The problem with this is that only a fool would believe anything a Boeing executive said, with their history of prevaricating.)