As a side note before today's blog, I just wanted to follow up on yesterday's blog with something I left out. King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng's tragic death brings another thing to mind. While his legacy is great, it will be interesting to find out what his recommendations were regarding my case. Did he recommend prosecuting me at Boeing's request while letting Boeing go fo their vastly greater frauds? Or was he advocating that I not be charged and investigating why Boeing withheld critical information from them and the judge that caused my arrest and (I believe) the illegal search and seizure of my property? While he, a Republican elected time and time again in a very Democratic County, which in itself speaks of his integrity, has a long legacy of acheivement. I hope whatever decisions he made on my case do not take away from that long history of being fair minded, and he did not side with the arguably corrupt management at Boeing against me, who, like him, was acting in the public interest, in my case trying to save lives before they were extinguished by the crimes I witnessed.

And on to today's blog:

Yesterday I saw the perfect job advertized for me. Unfortunately, however, even though I am way over-qualified for the position and arguably the most knowledgeable and best person possible for the job, I cannot apply just because I am not part of those pre-groomed for the position, some of which may be those I documented the fraudulent actions of on this site.

You can read the job announcement here:

http://federalgovernmentjobs.us/jobs/Su ... 14397.html

Perfect, indeed, huh? As the FAA's manager of Boeing's Certificate Management Office, I would know exactly what needs to be done to restore Boeing at long last to compliance with their Type and Production Certificates, as I know more about the corruption in Boeing's quality system than even some Boeing QA managers do!

But only current or former FAA employees can apply, no matter how qualified and unbiased the person applying is. Bias, you ask? You may think I'm biased against Boeing, but that is far from the truth. I want to see Boeing prosper, but I don't think the fraud I witnessed at Boeing is the way to prosperity for Boeing in the long term. It is far too risky, especially if the wrong (an ethical person that actually does their jobs per the regulations) person takes the helm of the CMO. If such a person did run the CMO, the STA of 1999/2000 would look infinitessimal by comparison to what they would have to do to get compliance at Boeing.

As I would be that type of CMO (an ethical one), what would I do to get a start at reform at Boeing?

Firstly, I couldn't pull Boeing's PC right away. Even though I have documented enough reasons to do so as an inspector at Boeing, I would have to gather sufficient evidence to make such a determination after I took over CMO duties. Of course, I expect that wouldn't take long. A week of audits I think would provide evidence as to the compliance or lack of compliance of Boeing's quality system. At that point, a decision could be made to pull their PC or not, a decision that was never seriously considered before by a CMO no matter how much evidence was presented to them of its imperativeness.

As I've seen no evidence at all while banished from Boeing that the FAA has made any reforms of Boeing from the state it was in as documented on this site, it would be my guess that the data would be the same--that Boeing's PC would have to be pulled for a time.

Pulling their PC would right many of the wrongs committed bt former FAA CMOs. All improper delegations to Boeing (all of them) of FAA functions would end immediately. Giving the new CMO, me, the leverage and clean slate needed with which to reform Boeing's Quality System.

A review of the cause of the total quality system breakdown that necessitated the pulling of Boeing's PC would then ensue, with non-management personnel given immunity if they cooperated in the investigation and gave their knowledge as to why the system had become so corrupt. Boeing Management misconduct, however, would not be excused except in cases that would result in convictions of the ring leaders of said corruption. Boeing management misconduct found (such as coercing inspectors to rollerstamp or removing inspectors from inspecting that refused to rollerstamp) would be referred in all cases to the FBI, Justice Department, or other relevant agency for investigation and prosecution. I, of course, would offer my testimony against the several Boeing managers I witnessed such misconduct of, one of which was promoted after I told Boeing headquarters of his misconduct, and one who now serves in a high position in the 787 quality department, ominously for that program, and who helped write a highly questionable policy called "Verification Acceptance Planning," or VAP, which I refer to, ala what George Bush Sr. called Reagan's "trickle down" economic plan, as "Voo-doo Acceptance Planning." After this culling of Boeing management of those implicated in the old Boeing rollerstamping quality system, Boeing management will be reformed, however I will keep a close eye on them to ensure such corruption and deference to Boeing Manufacturing wants, no matter how negatively they affect the quality of the airplanes produced, doesn't happen again.

I would require Boeing to train inspectors anew on how to really do their jobs in order to end rollerstamping once and for all. Of course, I would have to approve the training and the training's effectiveness at making Boeing inspectors into real, knowledgeable inspectors once again.

Once inspectors were trained in sufficient numbers, production could start again in areas where sufficent numbers of inspectors existed to oversee the quality and conformity of production. Of course, inspectors would be needed in much higher ratios than ever before at Boeing per mechanic.

Once these true inspectors have documented all the defects they find in production for a time (documentation that always does not happen and so makes bogus defect data now), I could judge the health of the production system, adjusting the inspector ratio up or down as required. With previous CMOs under Boeing's spell, adjusting inspector ratios up was no more of an option no matter how needed as pulling Boeing's PC.

I would hire extra Aviation Safety Inspectors to oversee the integrity of the new, compliant production system. To do so, I would increase ASIs at Boeing by at least a factor of ten, from the current 13 ASIs that have proven unable or unwilling to maintain compliance of Boeing's quality system to at least 130 ASIs. These ASIs would work closely with Boeing inspectors not only to report on the integrity of the inspection system, but to give tips to inspectors that need help doing their new jobs.

Of course, DMIRS and ARs would not exist in this new system. Those functions would revert to FAA personnel--new FAA personnel that have proven integrity and were not complicit in maintaining the old rollerstamping quality system I witnessed at Boeing.

I would immediately ban bogus (I believe) metrics that were once used by the CMO to judge compliance, such as the Cost of Rework and Repair System (CORRS), and go with the new, accurate data collected by inspectors documenting every defect they find on inspections. I would implement audits to ensure this Boeing provided data was indeed accurate before making decisisions based upon it.

Then the real and hard work of monitoring Boeing's Type and Production Certificates would begin. After a suitable time under this new bulletproof system--say five years--data collected by Boeing and CMO audits could be used to judge whether delegation of any FAA functions was actually warranted, such as reinstituting the DMIR or ODA delegations. Of course, in opposition to past practice, such delegations would only occur after Boeing proved themselves just as capable and unbiased as the FAA personnel their delegates would be taking the place of. Even self-inspection would not be off the table, a subject I have rightly denigrated before. If Boeing proves they have eliminated human error in the production process enough to warrant some areas being under self-inspection, so be it, with close monitoring. Because it is less costly and more efficient would not be a factor in my decisionmaking at the CMO--Certificate compliance would trump such Boeing wishes, as it has not in the past.

Once Boeing's quality system was restored, I would never take my eye off the ball of compliance so to speak. The new quality system would be the opposite of the last "quality system." It would be compliant, and Manufacturing and production flow would have to adjust to allow the quality system to function, and allow inspectors time to do their critical work and allow them time to document all defects found and time to inspect the repair/rework of defects before delivery. It would not be like the production system of today where inspectors are told by Boeing management to "alter their processes to meet the delivery schedule (rollerstamp to meet the schedule, however short it is)". Inspectors will be so consistent and competent that manufacturing won't be able to shop for an inspector that will buy something others won't, as those kind of inspectors will not exist anymore.

But, alas, I, the perfect person to restore Boeing's quality system that has over five years experience attempting to do so, am not allowed to apply as I am not part of the inner circle of the largely corrupt FAA.

I guess, however, if a person of integrity is by small chance hired as CMO, they could use the above template as what they will need to do to restore Boeing's quality system after many past years of lack of effective FAA oversight and CMOs who ignore reports of corruption in Boeing's quality system, no matter how bad that corruption is.

Which brings up the question, Where is the old CMO going?" Could they be going to a much higher paid position at Boeing? I wouldn't be surprised. If anyone in the CMO, MIDO, or TAD or Boeing knows, please email me with the answer. I am very curious what is going on there.

I do know that many of the people that ensured my report was only superficially investigated by the FAA so as to allow continued noncompliance at Boeing have been promoted over the past few years, just as at least two managers implicated in my report to the FAA have been promoted by Boeing.

You may want to apply for this job if you are corrupt and/or incompetent. It is hopefully one of the few places where those traits are handsomely rewarded.